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Figure 1: SpoC learns to spoof camera fingerprints. It can be used to insert camera traces to a generated image. Experiments
show that we can fool state-of-the-art camera-model identifiers which were not seen during training.
Abstract
Thanks to the fast progress in synthetic media genera-
tion, creating realistic false images has become very easy.
Such images can be used to wrap rich fake news with en-
hanced credibility, spawning a new wave of high-impact,
high-risk misinformation campaigns. Therefore, there is a
fast-growing interest in reliable detectors of manipulated
media. The most powerful detectors, to date, rely on the
subtle traces left by any device on all images acquired by it.
In particular, due to proprietary in-camera processes, like
demosaicing or compression, each camera model leaves
trademark traces that can be exploited for forensic anal-
yses. The absence or distortion of such traces in the tar-
get image is a strong hint of manipulation. In this pa-
per, we challenge such detectors to gain better insight into
their vulnerabilities. This is an important study in order
to build better forgery detectors able to face malicious at-
tacks. Our proposal consists of a GAN-based approach that
injects camera traces into synthetic images. Given a GAN-
generated image, we insert the traces of a specific camera
model into it and deceive state-of-the-art detectors into be-
lieving the image was acquired by that model. Likewise, we
deceive independent detectors of synthetic GAN images into
believing the image is real. Experiments prove the effective-
ness of the proposed method in a wide array of conditions.
Moreover, no prior information on the attacked detectors is
needed, but only sample images from the target camera.
1. Introduction
There have been astonishing advances in synthetic me-
dia generation in the last few years, thanks to deep learn-
ing, and in particular to Generative Adversarial Networks
(GANs). This technology enabled significant improvement
in the level of realism of generated data, increasing both
resolution and quality [53]. Nowadays, powerful methods
exist for generating an image from scratch [28, 7], and for
changing its style [60, 29] or only some specific attributes
[10]. These methods are very effective, especially on faces,
and allow one to easily change the expression of a person
[51, 46] or to modify its identity through face swapping
[43, 44]. This manipulated visual content can be used to
build more effective fake news. In fact, it has been estimated
that the average number of reposts for news containing an
image is 11 times larger than for those without images [26].
This raises serious concerns about the trustworthiness of
digital content, as testified by the growing attention to the
deepfake phenomenon.
The research community has responded to this threat by
developing a number of forensic detectors. Some of them
exploit high-level artifacts, like asymmetries in the color of
the eyes, or anomalies arising from an imprecise estimation
of the underlying geometry [39, 57]. However, technology
improves so fast that these visual artifacts will soon disap-
pear. Other approaches rely on the fact that any acquisition
device leaves distinctive traces on each captured image [9],
because of its hardware, or its signal processing suite. They
allow associating a media with its acquisition device at var-
ious levels, from the type of source (camera, scanner, etc.),
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Figure 2: A digital image of a scene contains camera-related traces of the image formation process that could act as a
fingerprint of a camera model. The used lenses and filters, the sensor and the manufacturer-specific digital processing
pipelines result in unique patterns. These patterns can be used to identify camera models.
to its brand/model (e.g. iPhone6 vs iPhone7), to the individ-
ual device [31]. A major impulse to this field has been given
by the seminal work of Luka`s et al. [33], where it has been
shown that reliable device identification is possible based
on the camera photo-response non-uniformity (PRNU) pat-
tern. This pattern is due to tiny imperfections in the silicon
wafer used to manufacture the imaging sensor and can be
considered as a type of device fingerprint.
Beyond extracting fingerprints that contain device-
related traces, it is also possible to recover camera model
fingerprints [12]. These are related to the internal digi-
tal acquisition pipeline, including operations like demosaic-
ing, color balancing, and compression, whose details differ
according to the brand and specific model of the camera
[31] (See Fig.2). Such differences help attribute images to
their source camera, but can also be used to better highlight
anomalies caused by image manipulations [17, 1]. In fact,
the absence of such traces, or their modification, is a strong
clue that the image is synthetic or has been manipulated in
some way [34, 12]. Detection algorithms, however, must
confront with the capacity of an adversary to fool them.
This applies to any type of classifier, and is also very well
known in forensics, where many counter-forensics methods
have been proposed in the literature [4]. Indeed, forensics
and counter-forensics go hand in hand, a competition that
contributes to improving the level of digital integrity over
time.
In this work, we propose a method to synthesize traces
of cameras using a generative approach that is agnostic to
the detector (i.e., not just targeted adversarial noise). We
achieve this by training a conditional generator to jointly
fool an adversarial discriminator network as well as a cam-
era embedding network. To this end, the proposed method
injects the distinctive traces of a target camera model in syn-
thetic images, while reducing the original generation traces
themselves, leading all tested classifiers to attribute such
images to the target camera (’targeted attack’).
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first work that
inserts real camera signatures into synthetic imagery to fool
unknown camera identifier. Indeed, previous work on fool-
ing camera model identification, based on adversarial noise
[22, 37] or pattern injection [30, 8], always considered only
real images. In addition, when generating the attack, as-
sume advance knowledge of the attacked CNN-based clas-
sifier or, at least, all camera models used to train them
[22, 37, 8]. In contrast, we work in an open set scenario,
and require exclusively a suitable number of images com-
ing from the target camera model1.
Hence, our main contributions are the following:
• we devise a GAN-based approach that inserts real cam-
era traces in synthetic images;
• we show that GAN generated images lose their specific
traces under this attack;
• we carry out targeted attacks against CNN-based cam-
era model detectors and show that they are easily
fooled by our approach;
• we compare results with several state-of-the-art meth-
ods based on adding adversarial noise and show that
they are ineffective on such a forensic application.
2. Related work
GAN attribution. Synthetic images do not contain
camera-related traces. However, they do contain traces
related to the pipeline used to generate them. With ref-
erence to GAN-generated images some interesting works
have been published recently. In [38], using a procedure
similar to PRNU-based extraction, evidence is given that
1. In principle, we do not even need to know the camera model itself.
each GAN image is characterized by a sort of artificial fin-
gerprints related to the specific GAN architecture. A similar
analysis is carried out in [58], where it is shown that GAN
fingerprints also depend on training data and random initial-
ization seeds. In [2], instead, the problem of GAN attribu-
tion is solved using generator inversion, with the additional
advantage of re-creating the generation process and improv-
ing the interpretability of the attribution decision. Finally,
in [59], it is recognized that GAN artifacts are caused by
the up-sampling components included in the common GAN
pipeline, which is identified using a classifier working on
spectrum data rather than image pixels.
All these works point out that GAN synthetic images
possess peculiar intrinsic characteristics which can be ex-
ploited to tell them apart from real ones. Such analyses
also justify the good performance of supervised CNN-based
methods when training and test include GAN-based images
generated using the same architectures [36, 42].
Camera model identification. Aside from explicitly us-
ing the device or camera fingerprints, camera model iden-
tification can be also carried out using deep learning-based
strategies [52, 5, 40]. These approaches are very effective
when the training set includes models that are also present
in the test set, as shown from the results of the IEEE Foren-
sic Camera Model Identification Challenge hosted on the
Kaggle platform2 in 2018. In general, most successful so-
lutions are based on very deep networks [50, 24, 11], that
perform well even when data are subjected to common post-
processing operations, like the re-compression routinely
performed when uploading images on social networks.
Counter-forensics on source identification. There is a
large literature in the forensics community on forensic-
aware attacks, which exploit knowledge about detection
methods to fool them [4]. Counter-forensics methods allow
researchers to better understand how current methods can
be attacked by a malicious user in order to improve their
performance in an adversarial setting. In [18] a PRNU fin-
gerprint is added to the image in order to make it appear as
it was taken by a different device. However, this procedure
is not easy to carry out, and a suitable countermeasure, the
triangle test can be used to discover such copy-fingerprint
attacks [19]. More sophisticated procedures are proposed in
[14] where an approach based on seam-carving is used for
anonymization, and [16], which uses a patch replacement
attack to desynchronize sensor noise fingerprints, while pre-
serving an acceptable visual quality.
Adversarial attacks to camera identification. Adversar-
ial attacks are conceived to fool a classifier by adding im-
perceptible perturbations [20]. [22] and [37] investigate on
the vulnerability of deep learning based camera model clas-
sifiers in a white box setting. They show that the attack is
effective only when the image is uncompressed, while in re-
alistic forensic applications the perturbation noise is hidden
by the compression artifacts. The analyses also highlight
the difficulty of transferring such attacks in the context of
camera model identification. This is part of a more general
behavior. Contrary to what happens in many computer vi-
sion applications [20, 32], in forensics applications, where
detectors rely on tiny variations of the data, transferability
for non-targeted attacks is not achieved easily [21, 3].
Adversarial attacks using generative networks. In the
literature, several papers have already addressed the prob-
lem of using generative networks to create adversarial ex-
amples. In [49] and [54] the adversarial examples are gen-
erated from scratch, with no further constraint. Other pa-
pers instead are more relevant to our scenario and use a
generative approach to slightly modify an existing image
[23, 45, 56, 8, 13]. In [45] the classifier under attack is sup-
posed to be perfectly known (white-box scenario) and its
gradient is used to train the generator of adversarial sam-
ples. In [23], instead, the attacker is only allowed to query
the classifier and observe the predicted labels (black-box
scenario). With this information, a substitute classifier is
trained and its gradient is used to train the generator. The
strategies of [45] for white-box scenarios and of [23] for
black-box scenarios are adapted by Chen et al. [8] for the
specific problem to fool a camera model classifier. In [56],
instead, these approaches are further extended by including
a discriminator network to distinguish between original and
attacked images, pushing the generator to improve the fi-
delity of the attacked image to the original. To adapt to a
face recognition scenario, where the number of classes is
not fixed in advance, in [13] the target classifier is replaced
with a face matcher based on the cosine similarity in the
embedding space.
Unlike previous works, our proposal does not require
knowledge of the classifier under attack [45, 56, 8], and not
even of the labels output by the network in response to se-
lected queries [23, 56, 8]. Moreover, although the use of an
embedder was already proposed in [13], we use a less re-
strictive loss in the embedding space. In fact, while in [13]
the distance of the generated example is minimized with
respect to a random sample of the target class, we mini-
mize distances to a representative anchor vector, and focus
mainly on critical outliers with respect to this anchor. In ad-
dition, our discriminator does not aim to preserve percep-
tual quality [56, 13], but to improve the generators ability
to introduce traces of the target camera model, and to re-
move peculiar traces of synthetic images. The objective is
2. https://www.kaggle.com/c/
sp-society-camera-model-identification/
thus similar to [8]; however, in our work we inject camera
model traces in synthetic images and not real ones. More
importantly, our strategy does not need to include the cam-
era model classifier in the generation process as done in [8],
but requires only images coming from the target distribu-
tion.
3. Reference Scenario
In this section, we describe in more detail our reference
scenario. We want to show that inconsistencies in camera
traces in forensics cannot be reliable even when the attacker
has very little knowledge about the classifier.
Targeted attack: Our goal is to make a synthetic image
appear as if it was taken by a specific real camera by in-
serting peculiar traces of the latter. Hence, our attack is
targeted, and our aim is to fool CNN-based camera model
identification detectors that will recognize the generated im-
age as if it was taken by the target camera model.
Available knowledge: We assume that the attacker has
no knowledge about the specific classifier and cannot make
queries to it. We only suppose that the training images are
drawn from the same distribution, that is, generated by the
targeted camera model. However, no knowledge is given on
the other camera models on which the classifier is trained.
Visual imperceptibility: We require that the attacked im-
ages look realistic and do not present visible artifacts. The
generation of realistic synthetic images is out of the scope of
this work, and we simply assume they are available. How-
ever, we require that the attack does not change the image
content and introduces a perceptually acceptable distortion.
Processing pipeline: Images are JPEG compressed after
being modified to simulate a realistic scenario. This is very
important since fake content is especially harmful when it is
uploaded on the internet and shared with a malicious goal,
such as creating fake news, and propagating false informa-
tion.
4. Proposed Method
LetRM be the set of real images generated by the target
camera modelM , and S a set of synthetic images generated
by some software tools. We aim to process the images in
S so as to make them forensically indistinguishable3 from
images in RM . That is, we want to find a transformation
TM (·) such that, with high probability,
Fi(TM (x)) =M, x ∈ S, i = 1, . . . , N
with Fi’s the available camera model classifiers. Since
state-of-the-art forensic classifiers focus on the traces left on
all acquired images by the model-specific processing suite,
such traces must be injected into the original image. We
pursue this goal by training a convolutional neural network
on images drawn from RM , such that eventually, for each
x ∈ S, y = TM (x) looks to classifiers as belonging toRM .
Meanwhile, to remain undetected, the attack is required not
to modify the semantic content of the image, and hence to
minimize some suitable measure of distortion d(x, y) be-
tween original and modified images.
4.1. Architecture
Our goal is to be agnostic to any signature-based camera
model identifier; i.e., we want more than inserting adversar-
ial noise to fool a specific identifier. To this end, we train
a CNN through a reformulated GAN schema. Specifically,
our proposal involves the use of three networks: a genera-
tor, a discriminator and an embedder. These are described
in the following, and depicted in Fig.3.
Generator: The Generator, G(·) = TM (·), has the goal
of introducing traces of a specific camera model M into
the input image, while preserving the semantic content. We
adopt an architecture formed by 7 convolutional layers. The
output of the last layer is summed to the input image and
then a hyperbolic tangent is applied to enforce valid color
values (all images are in [−1, 1]). Note that, before entering
the generator, the input image is Gaussian filtered with σ =
0.4 to remove possible high-frequency imperfections, such
as checkerboard artifacts.
Discriminator: In conventional GANs, the discriminator,
D(·), is required to distinguish real from generated images,
with the aim of pushing the generator to improve over time.
Accordingly, we could ask the discriminator to separate the
setsRM , real images of the target camera model, andG(S),
modified synthetic images. Instead, we train it to tell apart
RM from both G(S) and S, the set of original synthetic
images. By doing so, the generator is encouraged not only
to introduce traces of the target camera model, but also to
remove traces peculiar of synthetic images. We use a patch-
based discriminator [25] realized as a fully-convolutional
network with a fixed first layer. The fixed layer takes as in-
put the RGB image and returns 9 channels, which are the
original RGB components and their third-order horizontal
and vertical derivatives. In practice, this first layer extracts
the so-called image residuals, which highlight discriminat-
ing camera traces, speeding-up the network convergence
[52].
3. Of course, the synthetic images should also be visually realistic, but
we do not address this problem, here, and assume the generation tool pro-
duces already visually plausible images.
Figure 3: Our architecture is based on three components: a classical GAN setup, using a generator as well as a discriminator,
and an embedding network. By applying a content loss between synthetic images as well as spoofed images, we ensure that
our generator keeps the image content intact. The pre-trained embedder checks if we only generate specific camera traces.
In comparison to regular GAN methods, we use all three involved images for our discriminator, i.e., synthetic, spoofed and
camera typical images, and adjust the loss correspondingly.
Embedder: In addition to a generator and discriminator,
we use an embedder, E(·). This network is pre-trained off-
line, using images drawn from many camera models, to ex-
tract a compact 512-dimensional feature vector. It is trained
using a triplet-loss [48] with the goal of obtaining the same
feature vector for all images acquired by the same camera
model. Therefore, it provides a compact, model-specific,
representation of the image, independent of the current data.
For the embedder, we use the same fixed first layer used for
the discriminator.
4.2. Loss function of the generator
The goal of our scheme is to train an effective generator.
To this end, we define its objective function as the sum of
three losses,
LG = LCNT + λELEMB + λALADV (1)
each of which drives the generator towards a specific goal:
preserving the scene content (LCNT ), fooling the embed-
der (LEMB) and, fooling the discriminator (LADV ). These
losses are detailed in the following.
Scene content preserving loss: To achieve the first goal,
we use a combination of an objective distortion measure as
well as a perceptual loss between input and the output of the
generator:
LCNT = LREC + λpLPER (2)
As distortion measure we use an L1 distance between the
two images, LREC = Ex∼S [‖x−G(x)‖1]. Following
[27], we define the perceptual loss LPER as the sum of
the L1 distances between the feature maps extracted by the
VGG-19 network trained on ImageNet.
Embedder Loss: The second goal of the generator is to
fool the embedder, namely, to ensure that feature vectors
extracted from the transformed images are indistinguish-
able from those of real images of the target model. To this
end, by averaging the feature vectors of real images, we first
compute an anchor vector, eM = Ez∼RM [E(z)], repre-
senting the camera model in the embedding space. Then we
should aim at minimizing the distance, d(x) = ‖E(G(x))−
eM‖1, between feature vectors extracted from transformed
images and this anchor vector. However, from the literature
on triplet loss, it is well known that better results are ob-
tained by comparing distances [48]. Therefore, we first de-
fine a reference distance dref = Ez∼RM [‖E(z)− eM )‖1],
and then define the loss to minimize as
LDST = Ex∼S [ |d(x)− dref +m|+] (3)
where |x|+ = x for x > 0 and 0 otherwise, and m is the
margin of the triplet-loss fixed to 0.01 in our experiments.
To further help the generator to fool the embedder, we in-
clude also a feature matching loss, LFM , proposed in liter-
ature [53] to stabilize the training of GANs, which we com-
pute based on the feature maps extracted by the embedder of
the real and the transformed images. The final embedding
loss is then
LEMB = LDST + λfLFM (4)
Adversarial Loss: The discriminator, trained in parallel
with the generator, should output values close to 1 for real
images, x ∈ RM , and close to zero for synthetic images,
x ∈ S, both before and after being modified. Accordingly,
it relies on a modified binary cross-entropy loss:
LD = −Ex∼RM [logD(x)] +
− 12Ex∼S [log(1−D(G(x))) + log(1−D(x))]
(5)
which pools original and modified synthetic images.
A major goal of our generator is to modify the synthetic
images to fool the discriminator, i.e., to make the discrim-
inator believe they come from the target camera model.
Therefore, for the last term of Eq.(1) we adopt the standard
adversarial loss based on the binary cross-entropy:
LADV = −Ex∼S [logD(G(x))] (6)
which is minimized when D(G(x)) → 1, that is, synthetic
images are classified as real after being modified. Thus,
generator and discriminator concur to modify the synthetic
images to be similar to images of the target camera model
but also different from the original synthetic images.
5. Results
In this section we present the results of our experiments.
Specifically, we evaluate the proposed method in terms of
its ability to (a) deceive detectors of GAN-generated im-
ages into believing they are dealing with real images (see
Sec. 5.1) and, (b) deceive camera model identifiers into rec-
ognizing the modified images as acquired by the target cam-
era model (see Sec. 5.2). Special attention will be devoted
to testing robustness to off-training GANs. To this end, ex-
periments will be carried out on images generated by GAN
architectures never seen in the training phase.
We consider a dataset of real images acquired by differ-
ent camera models and a dataset of synthetic images gen-
erated by various GAN architectures. For the real images,
we use the 10 camera models adopted in the IEEE Foren-
sic Camera Model Identification Challenge, 400 images per
model are used for training, and 50 for testing. From the
test set we sample 25000-patches to test the camera model
identifiers. For the synthetic images, six GAN architectures
are considered: StarGAN [10], CycleGAN [60], ProGAN
[28], StyleGAN [29], RelGAN [55], and bigGAN [6]. For
each of the first five architectures, we take 20000 images
for training and 2000 for testing. In addition, 2000 bigGAN
images are used for testing, but none for training. All exper-
iments are carried out on 256× 256-pixel patches. For both
real images and high-resolution GAN images (generated by
ProGAN and StyleGAN) patches are extracted at random
locations from the whole image.
For each of the 10 camera models, a different generator-
discriminator couple is trained, using only real images of
the selected model. We use ADAM optimizers with a batch
size of 10 and 30 patches, respectively. For both networks,
the learning rate is set to 10−4, and the ADAM moments to
0.5 and, 0.999. Through preliminary experiments, the loss
weights are set to λE = 1, λA = 0.1, λp = 0.001, and
λf = 0.01. Training stops after 50K iterations.
The embedder is trained in advance using an external
dataset of 600 camera models and a total of 20394 images
GAN detectors
Xception Spec
before attack 99.98% 99.91%
after our attack 20.85% 4.83%
Table 1: True Positive Rate for the GAN detectors be-
fore and after the proposed attack using GAN architectures
within the training-set.
GAN detectors
Xception Spec
before attack 90.50% 20.25%
after our attack 2.50% 11.64%
Table 2: True Positive Rate for the GAN detectors before
and after the proposed attack using a GAN architecture out-
side the training-set.
publicly available on dpreviewer.com. We also adopt
ADAM for the embedder, with a batch of 80 patches, a
learning rate of 10−4 and default moments.
5.1. Fooling GAN-image detectors
Here, we show that our architecture largely succeeds
in removing the peculiar features of GAN images that
make them distinguishable from real images. To this
end, we challenge two CNN-based GAN-image detectors.
The first one is a general-purpose deep network, Xcep-
tion [11], which proved to be very effective in several
forensics applications, especially for detecting GAN im-
ages [36] and video deepfakes [47]. In addition, we con-
sider the spectrum-based (Spec) classifier4 proposed in [59],
which detects the frequency-domain peaks caused by the
up-sampling steps of common GAN pipelines. Both detec-
tors are trained on the same dataset used for the proposed
method. Testing is carried out on 256 × 256-pixel central
crop of 10000 synthetic images.
In Tab. 1, we show the results of this first experiment.
Both detectors have a true positive rate (TPR) close to
100%, that is, they detect GAN images with near certainty
(the same holds for real images, not shown in the table).
However, after modifying the synthetic images with our at-
tack, the TPRs decrease to 20.85% and 4.83%. It is also
interesting to observe the effect of our attack on the spectra
of GAN images (see Fig. 4). The spurious peaks almost
disappear, making detection virtually impossible.
In a second experiment, we work on the off-training im-
ages generated by the bigGAN architecture. Results are re-
ported in Tab. 2. While Xception keeps detecting GAN im-
ages with high accuracy, the spectrum-based classifier pro-
4. https://github.com/ColumbiaDVMM/AutoGAN
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Figure 4: The first row shows the original image and its
version after the attack. In the second row, we present the
corresponding Fourier transforms. It can be seen that the
GAN images present peaks in Fourier domain caused by
the up-sampling modules present in the architecture. These
artifacts reduce after the image has been attacked by the
injection of the camera traces.
vides worse results. This is also confirmed by the findings
of Ro¨ssler et al. [47] on the robustness of very deep CNNs,
while proving the fragility of the spectrum-based method
(Spec). Nonetheless, after modifying the images with our
generator, Xception’s TPR reduces drastically to 2.50%.
5.2. Fooling camera model ID detectors
In this section we analyze the ability of our method to
deceive camera model identifiers. To this end, we consider
four CNN-based target classifiers. The first two architec-
tures, Tuama2016 [52], and Bondi2017 [5], have been pro-
posed specifically for camera model identification. More-
over, in view of the results of the Kaggle competition on
camera model identification, we also consider two deep
general-purpose architectures, Xception [11] and Incep-
tionV3 [50], trained to work as camera model classifiers.
The performance of all these classifiers on our 10-models
test set, in the absence of any attack, is shown in Tab. 3.
Although all methods perform well, the very deep networks
clearly outperform the other classifiers.
We will compare the results of our proposal with four
baseline methods for the generation of adversarial attacks:
Projected Gradient Descent (PGD)5 [35], Translation-
Invariant Momentum Iterative Fast Gradient Sign Method
(TI-MI-FGSM) [15], Generative Adversarial Perturbation
(GAP)6 [45], and Generative Adversarial Attack against
Camera Identification (Adv-Cam-Id) [8]. All these methods
perform white-box attacks, i.e., they are trained with refer-
Tuama2016 Bondi2017 Xception InceptionV3
74.1% 87.1% 97.0% 95.4%
Table 3: Accuracy of camera model identification evaluated
on 25000 patches of dimension equal to 256× 256 pixels.
ence to a known target classifier. Here, we will consider
both Bondi2017 and Xception as target classifiers. How-
ever, to assess the transferability of the attack, we will eval-
uate performance also on all off-training classifiers. To im-
prove transferability, we also perform training an ensemble
of classifiers, as proposed in [15]; performance is evaluated
on the fourth one. For a fair comparison, we set the param-
eters of all methods in order to obtain a PSNR of ≈31dB.
We refer to the original papers for further detail.
Performance is measured in terms of a Successful At-
tack Rate (SAR), the fraction of modified synthetic images
that are classified as acquired by the target model. Re-
sults are computed on the central 256 × 256 crop of 10000
synthetic images, and averaged over 5 target models (Mo-
torola DroidMaxx, Samsung GalaxyS4, Sony Nex7, iPhone
4s and, Motorola X). Note that in the absence of any attack,
the average SAR is 10% for our 10-class setting. Results
are reported in Tab. 4 (top).
Several considerations are in order. First of all, it is clear
that all white-box attacks are very effective when tested on
the very same classifier used during training, Bondi2017 in
the first block, Xception in the second one. Such results
are emphasized with red text. However, there is no rea-
son to expect such a scenario in practice, as the defender is
free to use any classifier for camera identification. There-
fore, the most interesting results are those in black. On off-
training classifiers, only Adv-Cam-Id, among the baselines,
provides a reasonably good performance, never exceeding
60% though. Instead, SpoC performs quite well on all clas-
sifiers, with SAR going from 53% to 81%. With respect
to Adv-Cam-Id, the best baseline, it improves from 10%
to 30%. Training on an ensemble of classifiers should en-
sure higher transferability. However, the results of the third
block do not seem especially encouraging, with only minor
improvements and an average SAR barely exceeding 10%.
We also consider a scenario where images are JPEG
compressed using the quantization table of the target cam-
era model and we repeat the analysis, see Tab. 4 (bottom).
This corresponds to a realistic setting where images are
compressed before being spread over the web. In this case,
two contrasting phenomena occur. On one side, JPEG com-
pression acts as a defense against adversarial perturbations
reducing their strength. On the other side, since the images
5. https://github.com/BorealisAI/advertorch
6. https://github.com/OmidPoursaeed/Generative_
Adversarial_Perturbations
Uncompressed Images
Model Classifiers
Target Arch. Method PSNR Tuama2016 Bondi2017 Xception Incept.V3
PGD 30.98 12.31 96.23 0.49 2.65
Bondi2017 TI-MI-FGSM 31.51 8.05 63.56 9.02 0.59
GAP 30.85 9.91 74.34 2.46 17.16
Adv-Cam-Id 30.24 18.38 100.00 50.08 60.70
PGD 33.73 8.80 8.27 96.84 0.30
Xception TI-MI-FGSM 30.93 12.27 8.68 99.95 1.82
GAP 31.51 6.69 1.93 98.00 21.29
Adv-Cam-Id 29.91 23.29 41.35 99.98 42.19
PGD 32.88 12.23 11.39 5.06 2.22
Ensemble TI-MI-FGSM 31.32 13.24 9.58 13.10 2.80
(off-target) GAP 31.04 26.59 4.83 18.22 17.91
SpoC (ours) 31.71 53.34 67.57 81.37 71.65
JPEG Compressed Images
Model Classifiers
Target Arch. Method PSNR Tuama2016 Bondi2017 Xception Incept.V3
PGD 30.98 1.02 96.17 0.03 0.84
Bondi2017 TI-MI-FGSM 31.38 31.21 31.72 1.40 2.00
GAP 31.69 20.71 67.41 3.09 22.35
Adv-Cam-Id 30.18 24.08 89.46 54.51 58.79
PGD 33.52 24.71 6.06 98.21 0.19
Xception TI-MI-FGSM 30.77 35.05 3.16 87.94 6.51
GAP 32.09 5.36 0.57 96.42 5.54
Adv-Cam-Id 29.69 37.59 37.19 97.52 43.28
PGD 32.70 20.31 9.21 1.16 0.53
Ensemble TI-MI-FGSM 31.07 29.98 3.23 5.24 5.48
(off-target) GAP 31.97 25.45 4.25 12.10 6.79
SpoC (ours) 31.41 55.57 64.73 73.43 69.25
Table 4: Averaging results on 50000 images attacked using 5 different camera models. Performance is measured in terms of a
Successful Attack Rate (SAR). We compare with white-box attacks on Bondi2017 (first block) and Xception (second block)
and hence discard values on such architecture for the analysis (red). We also compare with methods using an ensemble of
classifiers (third block). Results on attacked images (top) and on their JPEG compressed version (bottom).
have been compressed using the same quantization matrix
of the camera model under attack, some performance im-
provement can arise thanks to these specific traces. For
these reasons, the edge of the proposed method with re-
spect to competitors is slightly reduced. Instead, in terms of
model classifiers, the network proposed by Tuama et al. [52]
gets significantly worse, as it relies heavily on compression
artifacts to distinguish different camera models.
6. Conclusion
In this work, we proposed a GAN-based method to at-
tack forensic camera model identifiers. Our scheme allows
to inject model-specific traces into the input image such to
deceive the classifier into believing the image was acquired
by the desired target camera model. Moreover, the method
requires no prior knowledge on the attacked network, and
works even on completely synthesized images, removing
also traces of the synthesis process.
Experimental results prove the effectiveness of the pro-
posed method and, as a consequence, the weaknesses of
current forensic detectors, calling for new approaches, less
dependant on critical hypotheses, and more resilient to un-
foreseen attacks.
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Supplemental Material
SpoC shows how to inject camera traces into synthetic
images. Given a GAN generated image, we are able to in-
sert the traces of a specific camera model into it, fooling
state-of-the-art detectors to believe the image was acquired
by that model. In this supplemental document, we report
the details of the architectures used for Generator, Discrim-
inator, and Embedder (Sec. A). Moreover, we carry out ab-
lation studies to validate our choices (Sec. B). For repro-
ducibility, we report the parameters of the used comparison
methods used in the main paper (see Sec. C). Finally, we
analyze the scenario where we attack images generated by
a GAN architecture not used in the training set (see Sec. D).
A. Architectures
Generator Our generator is composed of seven convolu-
tional layers with a fixed stride equal to one (see Fig.5). The
number of feature channels increases through the network
from 64 to 128 after the first three convolutional layers and
is set to the image channel size of three in the last layer. We
apply appropriate padding to keep the input image dimen-
sions of 256×256. In order to guide our adversarial train-
ing, we apply spectral normalization for our five middle lay-
ers as described in [41]. We use ReLU as non-linearity for
all layers besides the last. After the input has been passed
through our convolutional layers, we use a residual connec-
tion to add it to our output and squash the final result back
to image space using a Tanh non-linearity.
Discriminator As described in the main paper, the dis-
criminator uses a fixed first layer to extract low level image
features. This input is fed into a convolutional layer with
a kernel size of three. Afterwards, we use four blocks of
convolutional layers using a kernel size of three, spectral as
well as mean-only batch normalization. The number of fea-
ture channels is 64 for all these layers and we use ReLU as
non-linearity. The output is fed into a final convolutional
layer with kernel size of three to reduce the number of fea-
tures to one. We use no padding for all convolutional lay-
ers in our discriminator. The discriminator architecture is
shown in Fig.6.
Embedder As shown in Fig.7, the main layer in our em-
bedder is a residual block. This block has two branches. In
one branch, a convolution with kernel size one is applied,
while in the other branch, we make use of two convolu-
tions using a kernel size of three together with a ReLU non-
linearity. The outputs of the two branches are then summed
up to obtain the final output tensor. We adopt spectral nor-
malization for all convolutional layers. As described in
the paper, the input image of the embedder is first passed
through our fixed layer to extract low level image features.
The output is passed through four residual blocks following
each one by an average pooling of size two. The number
of feature channels linearly increases from 64 to 512. The
output is pooled to a single 512 dimensional tensor using a
global max pooling.
B. Ablation study
To show the importance of the usage of an embedder
and a discriminator in the training scheme, we compare two
variants. In the first variant, only-embedder, we remove the
discriminator by setting λD = 0 for the loss of the generator
(Equation 1 of the main paper). While in the second vari-
ant, only-discriminator, we remove the embedder by setting
λE = 0 for the loss of the generator. The other hyperpa-
rameters are not modified. Tab. 5 shows the performance of
the variants to deceive four camera-model classifiers. Per-
formance is measured in terms of Successful Attack Rate
(SAR). As can be seen this supports our choices. The only-
embedder variant obtains the worst results with the maxi-
mum SAR of 48.13% for Tuama2016 and a SAR lower than
15% for the other classifiers, while the only-discriminator
variant performs worse for all the four camera-model clas-
sifiers.
C. Comparison with state-of-the-art
In the main paper we compare our proposal with four
techniques that generate adversarial attacks. For all these
techniques, we set the parameters in order to obtain a PSNR
of about 31dB. In the following, we give more details about
these techniques.
PGD (Projected Gradient Descent attack) [35]: PGD
is an iterative attack method based on the evaluation of the
gradient of the loss function w.r.t the input image. At each
iteration, the image is modified with the projection of the
gradient into the space of allowed perturbations. For this
method, we use a number of iterations equal to 40 and an
epsilon for each attack iteration equal to 1.25.
TI-MI-FGSM (Translation-Invariant Momentum Itera-
tive Fast Gradient Sign Method) [15]: It is an iterative
version of the Fast Gradient Sign Method with the use of a
momentum term for the estimation of the gradient. More-
over, to improve the transferability of the attack, the gradi-
ent is computed considering a set of translated versions of
the image. For this method, we use a number of iterations
equal to 40, an epsilon for each attack iteration equal to 0.4
and, an overall epsilon equal to 8.
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Figure 5: Generator architecture.
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Figure 6: Discriminator architecture.
Model Classifiers
Method PSNR Tuama2016 Bondi2017 Xception Incept.V3
Proposal 31.71 53.34 67.57 81.37 71.65
only-embedder 49.71 48.13 6.76 10.75 13.18
only-discriminator 31.18 47.91 63.81 66.73 70.36
Table 5: Averaged results on 50000 images attacked using 5 different camera models. Performance is measured in terms of
Successful Attack Rate (SAR).
GAP (Generative Adversarial Perturantion) [45]: It is
a method where a generator network is trained in order to
obtain a perturbation able to fool the classifier with a con-
straint on the maximum allowed perturbation. The authors
propose two variants, Universal Perturbation, and Image-
dependent Perturbation. In the first case, the perturbation
does not directly depend on the image to attack, while in
the second case it depends on the image. We compare the
proposal with Image-dependent Perturbation that is a less
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Figure 7: Embedder architecture.
restrictive hypothesis and more coherent with our scenario.
As proposed by the authors, for the architecture of the gen-
erator network, we use ResNet Generator that is defined in
[27]. In our experiments, the epsilon of the constraint is set
equal to 8.
Adv-Cam-Id [8]: The white-box attack proposed in [8]
uses a generator network that provides a falsified version
of the image. The generator network is trained using two
losses, one is relative to the capability to fool the classifier
and the other is the L1 distance between the original im-
age and the falsified image. The generator architecture is
composed of a first block, that emulates the color filter ar-
ray, and seven convolutional layers. For our experiments,
we use the hyperparameters suggested by the authors and
stop the training when the PSNR is greater than or equal to
31dB.
D. Generalization
Both the proposed technique and the reference tech-
niques based on a generative network (GAP, and Adv-Cam-
Id) require a training phase. To test their ability to general-
ize, we add a further experiment, on images generated by a
GAN architecture not used in the training set. In Table 6 we
show the results. GAP shows about the same performance,
measured in terms of SAR and PSNR, on data generated
Model Classifiers
Target Arch. Method PSNR Tuama2016 Bondi2017 Xception Incept.V3
PGD 30.67 9.33 82.78 1.24 3.50
Bondi2017 TI-MI-FGSM 31.51 5.88 23.08 1.89 0.32
GAP 30.82 5.34 46.00 7.16 6.70
Adv-Cam-Id 25.29 17.95 99.87 37.66 58.88
PGD 34.04 5.06 1.13 97.60 0.15
Xception TI-MI-FGSM 30.91 7.83 0.57 99.98 0.57
GAP 31.27 6.57 0.67 87.97 7.32
Adv-Cam-Id 25.32 23.20 44.36 99.36 42.34
PGD 32.73 12.46 1.90 7.34 0.68
Ensemble TI-MI-FGSM 31.29 8.56 0.93 4.04 0.77
(off-target) GAP 30.99 24.55 0.48 17.28 8.87
SpoC (ours) 31.93 53.95 53.05 78.60 68.00
Table 6: Averaging results on 10000 images attacked using 5 different camera models using a GAN architecture [6] outside
the training set. Performance is measured in terms of a Successful Attack Rate (SAR). We compare with white-box attacks
on Bondi2017 (first block) and Xception (second block) and hence discard values on such architecture for the analysis (red).
We also compare with methods using an ensemble of classifiers (third block).
by architectures outside and inside the training-set. On the
contrary Adv-Cam-Id presents a PSNR loss of about 5dB,
while preserving a reasonably good SAR. Finally, compar-
ing the SpoC with respect to the other methods, it contin-
ues to have the better results, with SAR going from 53% to
78%, without any reduction in PSNR.
